PolymarketTime will tell, bro
Time will tell, bro
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共 14 条，显示第 1-14 条The house doesn't resolve UMA the rules do. If whales voted against the literal text of the contract, the entire Oracle would lose its credibility and value
The house doesn't resolve UMA the rules do. If whales voted against the literal text of the contract, the entire Oracle would lose its credibility and value
Look at the MSTR (MicroStrategy) precedent. In that market, BTC was actually sold before the deadline, but it still resolved No because the official confirmation (SEC filing) came one day too late. Here, the rules are even stricter. They require confirmation that Israel extended its commitment beyond the current scheduled end date, which was already June 29. In the MSTR case, "Yes" lost because of a timing technicality even though the event actually happened. In this market, the June 3 announcement doesn't even move the June 29 deadline by a single day. No new date was announced, no extension beyond the existing commitment was confirmed. If UMA followed the literal wording of the rules and resolved MSTR as No, then the same logic should apply here. No new date = no extension = NO
Look at the MSTR (MicroStrategy) precedent. In that market, BTC was actually sold before the deadline, but it still resolved No because the official confirmation (SEC filing) came one day too late. Here, the rules are even stricter. They require confirmation that Israel extended its commitment beyond the current scheduled end date, which was already June 29. In the MSTR case, "Yes" lost because of a timing technicality even though the event actually happened. In this market, the June 3 announcement doesn't even move the June 29 deadline by a single day. No new date was announced, no extension beyond the existing commitment was confirmed. If UMA followed the literal wording of the rules and resolved MSTR as No, then the same logic should apply here. No new date = no extension = NO
Rules over sentiment. Good luck to both of us.
Rules over sentiment. Good luck to both of us.
The June 3 announcement fails to meet the specific criteria defined in the market rules for two primary reasons: No Extension Beyond Scheduled End The rules explicitly state: “A qualifying announcement requires clear public confirmation... that Israel has extended its commitment... beyond its current scheduled end.” Fact: After the May 15 extension, the ceasefire was already scheduled to end on June 29. The Flaw: The June 3 statement contains no new date and no commitment to extend the timeline past June 29. Without a shift in the expiration date, there is no "extension beyond the scheduled end." Conditional Framework vs. Explicit Extension The rules state: “Agreements that outline... de-escalation measures, but do not explicitly extend the ceasefire, will not qualify.” Fact: The June 3 statement was an implementation framework "contingent on" (conditional upon) Hezbollah’s withdrawal. The Flaw: A conditional proposal is a "de-escalation measure," not an "explicit extension." Since the condition was rejected by Hezbollah the next day, no new commitment was ever established by Israel. Conclusion: The June 3 announcement was a failed conditional proposal that did not change the existing June 29 deadline. It does not satisfy the market’s strict definition of a qualifying extension.
The June 3 announcement fails to meet the specific criteria defined in the market rules for two primary reasons: No Extension Beyond Scheduled End The rules explicitly state: “A qualifying announcement requires clear public confirmation... that Israel has extended its commitment... beyond its current scheduled end.” Fact: After the May 15 extension, the ceasefire was already scheduled to end on June 29. The Flaw: The June 3 statement contains no new date and no commitment to extend the timeline past June 29. Without a shift in the expiration date, there is no "extension beyond the scheduled end." Conditional Framework vs. Explicit Extension The rules state: “Agreements that outline... de-escalation measures, but do not explicitly extend the ceasefire, will not qualify.” Fact: The June 3 statement was an implementation framework "contingent on" (conditional upon) Hezbollah’s withdrawal. The Flaw: A conditional proposal is a "de-escalation measure," not an "explicit extension." Since the condition was rejected by Hezbollah the next day, no new commitment was ever established by Israel. Conclusion: The June 3 announcement was a failed conditional proposal that did not change the existing June 29 deadline. It does not satisfy the market’s strict definition of a qualifying extension.
The number of shares is irrelevant to the facts. A market must resolve based on its written rules, not on who holds which position. The rules require an extension 'beyond the scheduled end,' and the June 3 statement simply doesn't provide one. That is a binary fact, regardless of my or your position.
The number of shares is irrelevant to the facts. A market must resolve based on its written rules, not on who holds which position. The rules require an extension 'beyond the scheduled end,' and the June 3 statement simply doesn't provide one. That is a binary fact, regardless of my or your position.
The June 3 announcement fails to meet the specific criteria defined in the market rules for two primary reasons: 1. No Extension Beyond Scheduled End The rules explicitly state: “A qualifying announcement requires clear public confirmation... that Israel has extended its commitment... beyond its current scheduled end.” Fact: After the May 15 extension, the ceasefire was already scheduled to end on June 29. The Flaw: The June 3 statement contains no new date and no commitment to extend the timeline past June 29. Without a shift in the expiration date, there is no "extension beyond the scheduled end." 2. Conditional Framework vs. Explicit Extension The rules state: “Agreements that outline... de-escalation measures, but do not explicitly extend the ceasefire, will not qualify.” Fact: The June 3 statement was an implementation framework "contingent on" (conditional upon) Hezbollah’s withdrawal. The Flaw: A conditional proposal is a "de-escalation measure," not an "explicit extension." Since the condition was rejected by Hezbollah the next day, no new commitment was ever established by Israel. Conclusion: The June 3 announcement was a failed conditional proposal that did not change the existing June 29 deadline. It does not satisfy the market’s strict definition of a qualifying extension.
The June 3 announcement fails to meet the specific criteria defined in the market rules for two primary reasons: 1. No Extension Beyond Scheduled End The rules explicitly state: “A qualifying announcement requires clear public confirmation... that Israel has extended its commitment... beyond its current scheduled end.” Fact: After the May 15 extension, the ceasefire was already scheduled to end on June 29. The Flaw: The June 3 statement contains no new date and no commitment to extend the timeline past June 29. Without a shift in the expiration date, there is no "extension beyond the scheduled end." 2. Conditional Framework vs. Explicit Extension The rules state: “Agreements that outline... de-escalation measures, but do not explicitly extend the ceasefire, will not qualify.” Fact: The June 3 statement was an implementation framework "contingent on" (conditional upon) Hezbollah’s withdrawal. The Flaw: A conditional proposal is a "de-escalation measure," not an "explicit extension." Since the condition was rejected by Hezbollah the next day, no new commitment was ever established by Israel. Conclusion: The June 3 announcement was a failed conditional proposal that did not change the existing June 29 deadline. It does not satisfy the market’s strict definition of a qualifying extension.
Breakdown of Wikipedia entry (June 3–4, 2026) June 3, 2026 The Lebanese health ministry reported that at least 48 people were killed in Israeli attacks in the previous 24 hours. Total Lebanese death toll rose to 3,516. Israel and Lebanon agreed to renew a ceasefire, mediated by the US, and plan to establish "pilot zones". Key point: On the same day the ceasefire agreement was announced, Israeli attacks continued and killed dozens of people. June 4, 2026 The Lebanese health ministry reported another 10 people killed in Israeli attacks. Total death toll reached 3,526. The IDF reported that a Hezbollah attack had hit the car of Northern Command chief Rafi Milo (incident happened earlier, no casualties). A Serbian UNIFIL peacekeeper was killed and two others injured in a strike on a UN base in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah officially rejected the truce deal announced the previous day and demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The IDF reported that a soldier from the 7th Armoured Brigade was killed by a Hezbollah anti-tank missile north of the Litani River. Israeli death toll in Lebanon rose to 29. Main Conclusion for Polymarket: This was not a real ceasefire extension: The announcement was conditional (“contingent on” Hezbollah stopping fire and withdrawing). Hezbollah rejected it the next day. Violence did not stop — heavy fighting continued on the same day and the day after the announcement (dozens killed, Israeli soldier and UN peacekeeper killed). This is very different from the previous extensions on April 23 and May 15, which actually led to a reduction in hostilities. This is strong evidence that the June 3 announcement was only a failed conditional proposal, not a qualifying ceasefire extension.
Breakdown of Wikipedia entry (June 3–4, 2026) June 3, 2026 The Lebanese health ministry reported that at least 48 people were killed in Israeli attacks in the previous 24 hours. Total Lebanese death toll rose to 3,516. Israel and Lebanon agreed to renew a ceasefire, mediated by the US, and plan to establish "pilot zones". Key point: On the same day the ceasefire agreement was announced, Israeli attacks continued and killed dozens of people. June 4, 2026 The Lebanese health ministry reported another 10 people killed in Israeli attacks. Total death toll reached 3,526. The IDF reported that a Hezbollah attack had hit the car of Northern Command chief Rafi Milo (incident happened earlier, no casualties). A Serbian UNIFIL peacekeeper was killed and two others injured in a strike on a UN base in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah officially rejected the truce deal announced the previous day and demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The IDF reported that a soldier from the 7th Armoured Brigade was killed by a Hezbollah anti-tank missile north of the Litani River. Israeli death toll in Lebanon rose to 29. Main Conclusion for Polymarket: This was not a real ceasefire extension: The announcement was conditional (“contingent on” Hezbollah stopping fire and withdrawing). Hezbollah rejected it the next day. Violence did not stop — heavy fighting continued on the same day and the day after the announcement (dozens killed, Israeli soldier and UN peacekeeper killed). This is very different from the previous extensions on April 23 and May 15, which actually led to a reduction in hostilities. This is strong evidence that the June 3 announcement was only a failed conditional proposal, not a qualifying ceasefire extension.
Breakdown of Wikipedia entry (June 3–4, 2026) June 3, 2026 The Lebanese health ministry reported that at least 48 people were killed in Israeli attacks in the previous 24 hours. Total Lebanese death toll rose to 3,516. Israel and Lebanon agreed to renew a ceasefire, mediated by the US, and plan to establish "pilot zones". Key point: On the same day the ceasefire agreement was announced, Israeli attacks continued and killed dozens of people. June 4, 2026 The Lebanese health ministry reported another 10 people killed in Israeli attacks. Total death toll reached 3,526. The IDF reported that a Hezbollah attack had hit the car of Northern Command chief Rafi Milo (incident happened earlier, no casualties). A Serbian UNIFIL peacekeeper was killed and two others injured in a strike on a UN base in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah officially rejected the truce deal announced the previous day and demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The IDF reported that a soldier from the 7th Armoured Brigade was killed by a Hezbollah anti-tank missile north of the Litani River. Israeli death toll in Lebanon rose to 29. Main Conclusion for Polymarket: This was not a real ceasefire extension: The announcement was conditional (“contingent on” Hezbollah stopping fire and withdrawing). Hezbollah rejected it the next day. Violence did not stop — heavy fighting continued on the same day and the day after the announcement (dozens killed, Israeli soldier and UN peacekeeper killed). This is very different from the previous extensions on April 23 and May 15, which actually led to a reduction in hostilities. This is strong evidence that the June 3 announcement was only a failed conditional proposal, not a qualifying ceasefire extension.
Breakdown of Wikipedia entry (June 3–4, 2026) June 3, 2026 The Lebanese health ministry reported that at least 48 people were killed in Israeli attacks in the previous 24 hours. Total Lebanese death toll rose to 3,516. Israel and Lebanon agreed to renew a ceasefire, mediated by the US, and plan to establish "pilot zones". Key point: On the same day the ceasefire agreement was announced, Israeli attacks continued and killed dozens of people. June 4, 2026 The Lebanese health ministry reported another 10 people killed in Israeli attacks. Total death toll reached 3,526. The IDF reported that a Hezbollah attack had hit the car of Northern Command chief Rafi Milo (incident happened earlier, no casualties). A Serbian UNIFIL peacekeeper was killed and two others injured in a strike on a UN base in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah officially rejected the truce deal announced the previous day and demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The IDF reported that a soldier from the 7th Armoured Brigade was killed by a Hezbollah anti-tank missile north of the Litani River. Israeli death toll in Lebanon rose to 29. Main Conclusion for Polymarket: This was not a real ceasefire extension: The announcement was conditional (“contingent on” Hezbollah stopping fire and withdrawing). Hezbollah rejected it the next day. Violence did not stop — heavy fighting continued on the same day and the day after the announcement (dozens killed, Israeli soldier and UN peacekeeper killed). This is very different from the previous extensions on April 23 and May 15, which actually led to a reduction in hostilities. This is strong evidence that the June 3 announcement was only a failed conditional proposal, not a qualifying ceasefire extension.
I respect the point, but I think the official wording is important here. Here is the official US State Department joint statement from June 3: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/joint-statement-of-the-united-states-of-america-republic-of-lebanon-and-state-of-israel-on-the-latest-high-level-trilateral-meeting Key sentence: “Israel and Lebanon agreed to the implementation of a ceasefire. The ceasefire is contingent on a complete cessation of Hizbollah fire and the evacuation of all Hizbollah operatives from the South Litani Sector.” This is a conditional proposal (contingent on), not a clear and unconditional announcement of a ceasefire extension. Hezbollah rejected it the very next day. Hostilities continued after the announcement (Israeli strikes, rocket attacks, and casualties on June 5–6). The previous extensions (April 23 and May 15) were different — they actually took effect. This one did not. According to the market rules, conditional proposals and agreements that did not result in an actual halt of hostilities should not qualify.
I respect the point, but I think the official wording is important here. Here is the official US State Department joint statement from June 3: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/joint-statement-of-the-united-states-of-america-republic-of-lebanon-and-state-of-israel-on-the-latest-high-level-trilateral-meeting Key sentence: “Israel and Lebanon agreed to the implementation of a ceasefire. The ceasefire is contingent on a complete cessation of Hizbollah fire and the evacuation of all Hizbollah operatives from the South Litani Sector.” This is a conditional proposal (contingent on), not a clear and unconditional announcement of a ceasefire extension. Hezbollah rejected it the very next day. Hostilities continued after the announcement (Israeli strikes, rocket attacks, and casualties on June 5–6). The previous extensions (April 23 and May 15) were different — they actually took effect. This one did not. According to the market rules, conditional proposals and agreements that did not result in an actual halt of hostilities should not qualify.
https://polymarket.com/event/israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by/israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by-june-7?locale=event&category=israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by&slug=israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by-june-7
https://polymarket.com/event/israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by/israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by-june-7?locale=event&category=israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by&slug=israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by-june-7
Hey guys, I wanted to share my thoughts on the Israel Hezbollah Ceasefire Extension market (June 7 resolution). I believe this market should resolve No. The June 3 joint statement was only a conditional proposal, not a real ceasefire extension: “The ceasefire is contingent on a complete cessation of Hizbollah fire and the evacuation of all Hizbollah operatives from the South Litani Sector.” Hezbollah immediately rejected the conditions. Fighting continued after the announcement (Israeli strikes + Hezbollah rockets, casualties on June 5-6, including Lebanese Army officers). This is very different from the previous clear extensions on April 23 and May 15. According to the market rules, conditional proposals and agreements that don’t result in an actual halt of hostilities should not qualify. What do you think? Curious to hear other opinions.
Hey guys, I wanted to share my thoughts on the Israel Hezbollah Ceasefire Extension market (June 7 resolution). I believe this market should resolve No. The June 3 joint statement was only a conditional proposal, not a real ceasefire extension: “The ceasefire is contingent on a complete cessation of Hizbollah fire and the evacuation of all Hizbollah operatives from the South Litani Sector.” Hezbollah immediately rejected the conditions. Fighting continued after the announcement (Israeli strikes + Hezbollah rockets, casualties on June 5-6, including Lebanese Army officers). This is very different from the previous clear extensions on April 23 and May 15. According to the market rules, conditional proposals and agreements that don’t result in an actual halt of hostilities should not qualify. What do you think? Curious to hear other opinions.
https://polymarket.com/event/israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by/israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by-june-7?locale=event&category=israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by&slug=israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by-june-7
https://polymarket.com/event/israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by/israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by-june-7?locale=event&category=israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by&slug=israel-announces-lebanon-ceasefire-extension-by-june-7
Hey guys, I wanted to share my thoughts on the Israel Hezbollah Ceasefire Extension market (June 7 resolution). I believe this market should resolve No. The June 3 joint statement was only a conditional proposal, not a real ceasefire extension: “The ceasefire is contingent on a complete cessation of Hizbollah fire and the evacuation of all Hizbollah operatives from the South Litani Sector.” Hezbollah immediately rejected the conditions. Fighting continued after the announcement (Israeli strikes + Hezbollah rockets, casualties on June 5-6, including Lebanese Army officers). This is very different from the previous clear extensions on April 23 and May 15. According to the market rules, conditional proposals and agreements that don’t result in an actual halt of hostilities should not qualify. What do you think? Curious to hear other opinions.
Hey guys, I wanted to share my thoughts on the Israel Hezbollah Ceasefire Extension market (June 7 resolution). I believe this market should resolve No. The June 3 joint statement was only a conditional proposal, not a real ceasefire extension: “The ceasefire is contingent on a complete cessation of Hizbollah fire and the evacuation of all Hizbollah operatives from the South Litani Sector.” Hezbollah immediately rejected the conditions. Fighting continued after the announcement (Israeli strikes + Hezbollah rockets, casualties on June 5-6, including Lebanese Army officers). This is very different from the previous clear extensions on April 23 and May 15. According to the market rules, conditional proposals and agreements that don’t result in an actual halt of hostilities should not qualify. What do you think? Curious to hear other opinions.